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LOUISIANA CIVIL PROCEDURE
Howard W. L'Enfant, Jr.*
VENUE-CUSTODY
Article 74.2 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, added by Act
62 of 1983, provides the venue for an action to obtain custody or to change
custody as follows: A proceeding to obtain legal custody of a minor may
be brought in the parish where a party is domiciled or in the parish of
the last matrimonial domicile; a proceeding for change of custody may
be brought in the parish where the original decree was rendered or in
the parish where the person awarded custody is domiciled; if that person
is no longer domiciled in the state, then the proceeding may also be
brought in the parish where the person seeking custody is domiciled. The
article also provides for transfer of the proceeding to another court where
the proceeding might have been brought if such a transfer would be in
the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties and witnesses.
Prior to the enactment of this article, no provision in the Code of Civil
Procedure governed venue in custody proceedings; the problems caused
by the absence of such a provision may be illustrated by two cases decided
before the adoption of this article.
In Parker v. Parker,' a judgment of separation rendered in Bienville
Parish awarded custody to the mother. A subsequent divorce decree
rendered in East Baton Rouge Parish in favor of the father affirmed the
award of custody to the mother. Thereafter, the father filed a rule for
change of custody in East Baton Rouge, where he was domiciled. The
mother objected to venue on the grounds that she and the child were
domiciled in Bienville Parish. The trial court sustained the objection, and
the court of appeal affirmed. The court reasoned that, in light of the
recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Lewis v. Lewis,' it could no
longer follow the court-created rule that venue for change of custody was
where the divorce decree had been rendered if that decree made an award
of custody.3 In Lewis, the court held that an action for child support
was not incidental to an action for separation or divorce but was an in-
dependent action based on the obligation of parentage. Citing Howard
v. Howard,4 which had applied Lewis similarly, the court in Parker ap-
plied the same reasoning to an action for change of custody. Since under
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 432 So. 2d 1010 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
2. 404 So. 2d 1230 (La. 1981).
3. Sims v. Sims, 388 So. 2d 428 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 394 So. 2d 612
(La. 1980); Dupre v. Pelotto, 336 So. 2d 329 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976); Hopkins v. Hopkins,
300 So. 2d 661 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974); Caldwell v. Gilbert, 253 So. 2d 639 (La. App
3d Cir. 1971).
4. 409 So. 2d 279 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
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this reasoning the prior exception was no longer applicable, the court could
only follow the basic rule of venue'-that the action must be brought
in the parish of the defendant's domicile, Bienville Parish.
Under article 74.2, the father could have filed the action for change
of custody in East Baton Rouge Parish, where the custody award had
been confirmed by the divorce decree, or in Bienville Parish, where the
mother who had been granted custody was domiciled. Either parish would
have been proper because each court had an interest in the children and
had access to the information necessary to reach a decision on custody-
the East Baton Rouge Parish Court because that is where the decree was
confirmed, and the Bienville Parish Court because that is where the
children and custodial parent were living.
In the second case, also styled Parker v. Parker' but unrelated to
the first case, the parties had been judicially separated by a judgment
rendered in Jefferson Parish, and, by consent, custody was given to the
mother. A judgment of divorce was rendered in Iberia Parish, and custody
originally was given to the father but later was changed to the mother.
The father filed for change of custody in Jefferson Parish, and the mother
objected to jurisdiction and venue on the grounds that she, and therefore
also the child, were domiciled in Colorado. The trial court rejected both
objections and awarded custody to the father. On appeal, the fourth cir-
cuit affirmed the finding of jurisdiction on the grounds that the child
and his parents had a significant connection with Louisiana; thus, Loui-
siana could assert jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic-
tion Act7 even if the mother had established domicile in Colorado-a fact
not clearly established by the record. On the issue of venue, the court
concluded that Jefferson Parish was a proper venue, regardless of the
child's domicile, for two reasons: The child was living there with his grand-
parents and attending school when the action was filed, and the judg-
ment of separation had been rendered there. Furthermore, had there been
no change of domicile, the child might still be domiciled in Jefferson
Parish.
If the action for change of custody were brought under article 74.2,
the result would be different. The father could bring the action for change
of custody in Iberia Parish, where the divorce and custody decree in favor
of the mother was rendered, because that court would continue to have
an interest in the welfare of the minor. If the mother were not domiciled
in Louisiana, then the action also could be brought in the parish where
the father was domiciled-Lafourche Parish. If the mother were domi-
ciled in Louisiana, then the action could be brought in the parish of her
5. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 42.
6. 424 So. 2d 479 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982), writ denied, 427 So. 2d 1198 (La. 1983).
7. LA. R.S. 13:1702(A)(2) (1983).
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domicile as well as in Iberia Parish, but it could not be filed in Lafourche
Parish. Jefferson Parish would be proper venue only if it were the parish
of the mother's domicile.
PRESCRIPTION
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Farnsworth,' an
automobile insurer, as subrogee of the rights of its insured, filed a timely
action against the insurer, and driver of one of the vehicles involved in
the rear-end collision to recover the payments made to the plaintiff's in-
sured. The accident occurred on July 19, 1978, and the suit was filed
on July 19, 1979. On August 23, 1979, the defendant's insurer filed a
third-party demand against the driver, the owner, and the insurer of the
other vehicle involved in the collision, seeking indemnification and con-
tribution. The third-party defendants filed an answer, asserting defenses
to the principal claim. On August 12, 1980, the plaintiff filed an amended
petition alleging that the third-party defendants were solidarily liable with
the original defendants. The trial court rejected the third-party defendants'
objection of prescription and, after trial, found those defendants solely
liable to the plaintiff. The court of appeal, affirming the ruling of the
trial court on the issue of prescription, found that the third-party demand
was timely filed within the ninety-day period provided by article 1067 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. 9 Thus the third-party defendants had received
the kind of notice which fulfilled the purpose of the prescription statutes-
protecting a defendant from stale claims and from the loss of. relevant
evidence. The third-party demand gave the third-party defendants formal
notice of the claim being asserted by the plaintiff; in fact, those defen-
dants had asserted their defenses even before the plaintiff amended the
petition to name them as co-defendants. The court did not consider it
important that the third-party defendants had not received notice within
the year because such notice is not required. Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:5801 requires only that the claim be filed timely; here, the third-party
demand had been timely filed.
Ordinarily, prescription on the plaintiff's tort claim against the third-
party defendants could be interrupted in one of two ways. First, by filing
the claim in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue within one year
of the accident, prescription is interrupted even though a defendant may
not receive formal notice through service of process until after the year
has run. Ordinarily, a defendant in such a situation receives notice within
a short time after filing; this brief delay in notification does not thwart
the objective of the prescription statutes-protecting the defendant from
stale claims. Furthermore, to require service of process within the year
8. 425 So. 2d 827 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982).
9. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1067.
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would expose the plaintiff's claim to the risks and delays which ordinarily
accompany service of process. In balancing the risks to the plaintiff against
the interests of the defendant in receiving prompt notice of the claim,
the decision was made in favor of the plaintiff. The second way prescrip-
tion could be interrupted is by filing a timely claim against a defendant
who is bound in solido with the third-party defendants.' 0 Prescription is
interrupted even though the third-party defendants might not receive for-
mal notice of the claim until months or even years after the one-year
period has expired. Each defendant is considered liable for the whole
obligation, and the filing of a formal demand for payment of the obliga-
tion interrupts prescription on that obligation as to each obligor." But
if the original defendant is found to be not liable, as happened in this
case, then prescription would not have been interrupted as to the subse-
quently joined and solely liable defendant.2
These principles were applied in Carona v. Radwin,'3 a case involv-
ing a third-party demand filed within the one-year period and an amended
petition naming the third-party defendant codefendant filed after the one-
year period had run. In ruling on the third-party defendant's plea of
prescription, the fourth circuit could not apply the principles of solidarity
because the original defendant had been found not liable; nevertheless,
the court rejected the plea of prescription on the grounds that the third-
party demand supplied the requisite notice within the one-year prescrip-
tive period that the third party's negligence allegedly was a cause of the
plaintiff's injuries. The subsequently served amended petition simply
reasserted those allegations.
The important fact in Carona is that the third-party defendant had
received notice of the claim within the one-year period. Later cases have
refused to find that prescription is interrupted where the third-party
demand is filed after the one-year period has expired.' 4 But the court
in Farnsworth, although citing Carona, did not consider notice within the
prescriptive period important; it looked only to a timely filing of the ac-
tion. In so doing, the court has increased a tortfeasor's exposure to suit.
In reaching its decision, the court found that the third-party demand was
timely because it was filed within ninety days from service of the prin-
cipal demand in accordance with article 1067 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, which provides that an incidental action which is not barred by
10. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2097.
11. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2091.
12. See Trahan v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 350 (La. 1975); Gibson v. Exxon
Corp., 360 So. 2d 230 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978); Small v. Caterpillar Mfg. Co., 319 So.
2d 843 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
13. 195 So. 2d 465 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 La. 639, 197 So. 2d 897 (1967).
14. Brady v. Bernard, 230 So. 2d 413 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970); Ward v. Aucoin,
222 So. 2d 628 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
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prescription at the time the principal demand is filed is not barred by
prescription if filed within ninety days from service of the principal
demand. However, since prescription does not begin to run on a claim
for indemnification or contribution until the defendant is cast in judg-
ment, a third-party demand asserting such a claim would not be barred
by prescription even if filed more than ninety days after service of the
principal demand. In fact, the only limitation on the filing of a third-
party demand is whether the filing of that demand will adversely affect
trial of the principal action; a third-party demand may be filed at any
time before answer to the principal demand is filed and may be filed
thereafter with the permission of the court if it will not retard the pro-
gress of the principal action. 5 Therefore, a third-party demand could be
filed timely long after the one-year period had expired. Under the reason-
ing of Farnsworth, the third-party defendant could then be joined as a
codefendant by the plaintiff. This result seems to be at odds with the
purpose of the prescription statutes, i.e., to protect the defendant from
stale claims, and, before Farnsworth, it had been possible only under the
exception for solidary obligors.
PRESCRIPTION-MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACT
Louisiana's Medical Malpractice Act' 6 provides that the filing of a
claim with the medical review panel suspends prescription until ninety days
following the issuance of the opinion by the panel. In Kaltenbacher v.
Jefferson Parish Service District," the panel rendered its opinion in July,
1980, and a copy of the opinion was sent by regular mail to plaintiff's
attorney on September 7, 1980. Because he had moved, however, he did
not learn of the opinion until February 9, 1981. A copy of the opinion
was sent by certified mail to all parties as required by statute'8 on May
7, 1981. Suit was filed on July 31, 1981, and defendant filed a plea of
prescription. In ruling on this issue, the court interpreted "issuance of
the opinion" to mean receipt by the plaintiff of the opinion of the panel
by registered or certified mail, explaining that certified or registered mail
provides proof that plaintiff has received notice of the opinion and also
provides a fixed point from which to determine the time left for filing
suit. By choosing this interpretation, the court also is requiring that the
plaintiff receive actual notice of the decision of the panel.
DISCOVERY-REQUEST TO ADMIT
On appeal from a judgment in a suit on an open account, the plain-
15. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1033.
16. LA. R.S. 40:1299.47(A) (Supp. 1983).
17. 424 So. 2d 434 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
18. LA. R.S. 40:1299.47(J) (Supp. 1983).
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tiff in D.H. Holmes Co. v. Dronet9 argued that judgment should have
been granted for the full amount because the defendant failed to answer
plaintiff's request for admissions. In reply the third circuit stated:
In our view, failure to answer under Article 1467 does not per
se result in requests for admissions being deemed an admission
of the facts sought to be established. This device should not be
applied to a controverted legal issue which goes to the heart of
the merits of a case.
20
The court further stated that the defendant had denied the debt in his
answer and in his answer to interrogatories, therefore placing the burden
of proving each element of his claim on the plaintiff. The court then
found that the plaintiff had met this burden and amended the judgment
to allow the plaintiff the full amount demanded.
In ruling on the effect to be given to the defendant's failure to answer
the request for admissions, the court relied on Entron, Inc. v. Callais
Cablevision, Inc.,2 which had held that, in the light of the 1966 Loui-
siana Supreme Court case of Voisin v. Luke, 22 a request for admissions
could not be applied to a disputed legal issue which goes to the heart
of the merits of the case. This position, however, was rejected expressly
by the supreme court in Succession of Rock v. Allstate Life Insurance
Co., 3 in which the succession of the deceased sued to recover on a policy
insuring the lives of employees against accidental death. The request for
admissions served on the defendant covered all of the important factual
issues in the case-the existence of the policy covering employees, that
the deceased was an employee, that he was covered at the time of his
death, that his death was accidental, that the defendant had failed to pay
the amount of the policy to the succession, and that the succession was
the proper beneficiary. When the defendant failed to serve answers to
these requests, the supreme court concluded that under article 1496 of
the Code of Civil Procedure the admissions are "facts of record which
courts must recognize." ' 24 The defendant had relied on Voisin, but the
supreme court interpreted that case as being one in which the defendant
had denied the request for admissions through the verified exceptions which
had been filed.
Thus, it seems clear in the light of Succession of Rock that a request
for admissions can be used to establish a fact, even if it goes to the heart
of the case. This is in accord with the purpose of the request to admit-
19. 432 So. 2d 1135 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
20. Id. at 1136.
21. 307 So. 2d 787 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
22. 249 La. 796, 191 So. 2d 503 (1966).
23. 340 So. 2d 1325 (La. 1977).
24. Id. at 1331.
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to eliminate those facts which are undisputed and thus to reduce the scope
of the trial. The correct procedure for an opponent who disputes the fact
as to which the request has been made is to serve an answer denying
the requested admission. Article 1467 of the Code of Civil Procedure states:
A party who considers that a matter of which an admission has
been requested presents a genuine issue for trial may not, on that
ground alone, object to the request; he may, subject to the pro-
visions of Article 1472, deny the matter or set forth reasons why
he cannot admit or deny it.
Whether the failure to serve answers to the request for admission con-
stitutes an admission is uncertain. Article 1467 seems clear that it does:
"The matter is admitted unless, within fifteen days after service of the
request, or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow,
the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting
the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter . .. .
However, the court in Dronet stated that the failure to answer does not
per se result in the admission of the facts sought to be established. This
position finds support in the supreme court cases of Voisin and Succes-
sion of Rock. In Voisin, the defendant filed verified exceptions denying
the matters addressed in the requested admission within fifteen days of
the service of the requests. Rejecting a subsequently filed answer to the
request for admissions as untimely, the trial court granted plaintiff's mo-
tion for summary judgment based on the facts deemed to be admitted
by the defendants through their failure to answer. The judgment was af-
firmed on appeal but reversed by the supreme court, which ruled that
it was error for the trial court to grant a summary judgment on the basis
of defendant's admissions of fact, where the defendant had denied those
facts in his answer to the petition, in his exceptions, in his untimely answer
to the request, and in his answer to the motion for summary judgment.
The court concluded that a technical application of the article would be
unfair-the defendant had vigorously contested the matters addressed in
the requests-and that a pleading error should not cost the defendant .his
trial on the merits, especially when the plaintiff knew through other
pleadings that the defendant disputed these facts. In Succession of Rock,
the supreme court allowed the defendant's failure to serve a timely answer
to the request to admit to serve as an admission of the facts covered
in the request because, unlike the situation in Voisin, the defendant had
filed no pleadings contesting any of the factual issues in the case. Ap-
parently, the court in Dronet concluded that the defendant's answer to
the petition and answers to the interrogatories could substitute for the
answer to the request to admit. Unfortunately, however, the court cited
neither Voisin nor Succession of Rock as authority; rather, it concluded
thatthis device should not be applied to a controverted issue in the case.
Certainly the provisions of articles 1466 and 1467 of the Code of
19831
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Civil Procedure should not be applied strictly if to do so would be un-
fair, as where the defendant files an untimely answer to requests, but
these provisions should not be totally ignored. Ordinarily, an answer to
the petition or answers to interrogatories cannot serve as a sufficient
substitute for an answer to a request to admit, because each has a dif-
ferent function. The answer to the petition, filed early in the proceedings
before any discovery has occurred, is intended as an initial response to
the petition; it is generally a denial of almost all of the allegations in
the petition, usually on the grounds of insufficient information. The re-
quest to admit, which is used later in the proceedings and after discovery,
is intended to narrow the scope of the issues from what was originally
established in the petition and answer. Interrogatories seek information,
and favorable answers can be used at trial as admissions by a party to
establish a disputed fact, but the purpose of the request to admit is to
eliminate from the trial those facts on which there is no dispute. If it
is to fulfill its purpose, the opponent should be required to respond to
the request.
JURY TRIAL-COSTS
In Babin v. Ivy,25 the defendant timely requested a jury and posted
the bond for costs. When the clerk billed the defendant for juror fees,
cost of issuing jury notice, and cost for service of jury notices, the defen-
dant requested a writ of mandamus from the trial court, which was denied.
He then sought writs of mandamus and certiorari from the court of ap-
peal. That court ruled that the bond supplied by the defendant covered
the per diem and mileage costs of the jury 6 and that all other costs must
be paid by "the party primarily responsible therefor."" Although the court
felt that the defendant should be the party primarily responsible for these
costs since the defendant had requested the jury, it nevertheless concluded
that it was bound to follow the contrary interpretation of the supreme
court28 and held that the plaintiff is the party primarily responsible for
paying the costs in the trial court, until a final judgment is rendered.
The result in this case, although clearly correct under the law as it existed
then, would be different under article 1734 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, which, as amended by Act 534 of 1983, provides that "the amount
of the bond is to cover all costs related to the trial by jury." Thus, under
the facts of this case, the bond furnished by the defendant would cover
not only the per diem and mileage expenses, but also the costs of prepar-
25. 432 So. 2d 281 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
26. LA. R.S. 13:3049-:3050 (Supp. 1983).
27. LA. R.S. 13:843 (Supp. 1983).
28. Meyers v. Basso, 398 So. 2d 1026 (La. 1981); Crespo v. Visla, 152 La. 1088, 95
So. 256 (1922).
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ing the notices, the costs of securing the notices, and any other costs related
to the jury.
JURY TRIAL-MIsTRIAL
When the plaintiff's suicide attempt prevented her from testifying at
the close of her case, plaintiff's counsel moved for a mistrial, but the
trial court dismissed her suit with prejudice on its own motion. The court
of appeal affirmed the decision, but found error in the reasoning of the
trial court.2 9 After first noting that a trial judge is without power to dismiss
a case on his own motion,3" the court of appeal stated that the plaintiff's
motion for a mistrial should have been interpreted as a motion for a
dismissal without prejudice because the motion for a mistrial does not
exist as a procedural device in civil cases in Louisiana,3' whereas the grant-
ing of a motion to dismiss, with or without prejudice, is within the discre-
tion of the trial judge. The court then concluded that the trial court had
not abused its discretion in dismissing the suit with prejudice.
The supreme court reversed,32 ruling first that under article 1671 of
the Code of Civil Procedure the trial court has no discretion to dismiss
with prejudice. The trial judge has authority either to grant the motion
or to refuse to dismiss except with prejudice. If the plaintiff objects to
a dismissal with prejudice, the case continues. Second, the court noted
that "mistrial" is not unknown in civil cases in Louisiana," and, although
not expressly referred to in the Code of Civil Procedure, its use is author-
ized by article 191 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that
"[a] court possesses inherently all of the power necessary for the exercise
of its jurisdiction even though not granted expressly by law." 34 The court
concluded that under the facts in this case it was error to dismiss with
prejudice and remanded the case for a new trial.
This ruling protects a plaintiff who moves for a dismissal without
prejudice from the unexpected and unfair result of having his case dis-
missed with prejudice. In addition, by giving express recognition to the
motion for a mistrial, the ruling makes it clear that the trial court may
act on its own motion to insure a fair trial. Authority for the mistrial
motion exists not only in article 191, as cited by the supreme court, but
also in article 1631 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that
29. Spencer v. Children's Hospital, 419 So. 2d 1307 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
30. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 1671-1672.
31. In reaching this conclusion the court of appeal relied on the fact that it is not
mentioned in the Code of Civil Procedure. The court did not discuss the numerous cases
in which the term is used. See cases cited in Spencer v. Children's Hospital, 432 So. 2d
823, 825 nn.1-7 (La. 1983).
32. 432 So. 2d 823 (La. 1983).
33. Id. at 825 nn.1-7.
34. The court also cited Civil Code article 21.
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"the court has the power to require that the proceedings shall be con-
ducted with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner, and to
control the proceedings at the trial, so that justice is done."
APPEALS
Article X, section 12 of the Louisiana Constitution provides in part:
"The decision of a commission shall be subject to review of any question
of law or fact upon appeal to the court of appeal wherein the commis-
sion is located, upon application filed with the commission within thirty
days after its decision becomes final." If an application for appeal is
mailed to the commission within thirty days but is not received until the
thirty-first day because the thirtieth day was a Sunday, is the appeal timely?
The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that it was not timely
in Thomas v. Department of Corrections." The court interpreted the
phrase "filed with the commission" to mean that the application must
actually be deposited with the commission. Although article 5059 of the
Code of Civil Procedure generally extends the period by a day if the last
day is a legal holiday, the court ruled that the constitutional provision
which requires filing (i.e., deposit) within thirty calendar days is not af-
fected by that article. Nor could the constitutional provision be affected
by rule 2-13 of the Uniform Rules-Courts of Appeal, which treats a
timely deposit in the mail as timely filing. This interpretation, although
supportable in the language of article X, section 12, seems unduly strict.
The principle that appeals are favored would have been served if the court
had applied article 5059, which, while protecting the appeal, would have
increased the thirty-day period by only a day or two at the most.
ACTION TO ANNUL-AIJOPTION
When the father filed suit in 1980 in a Georgia court for change of
custody, the mother answered that an adoption decree rendered in St.
Tammany Parish on December 11, 1978 had terminated all of his paren-
tal rights. Eight months later, on January 27, 1981, the father filed an
action in St. Tammany Parish to have the adoption decree declared null;
the mother then filed an exception of prescription based on Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:440 which provides:
No action to annul a final decree of adoption rendered prior
to July 31, 1974, for any reason, may be brought. No action to
annul a final decree of adoption rendered prior to September 7,
1979, for any reason, shall be brought after a lapse of six months
from September 7, 1979.
35. 430 So. 2d 1153 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), writ denied.
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The trial court sustained the exception; the court of appeal affirmed, but
the supreme court reversed.36
Although the statute contains very broad language-"No action to
annul . . . for any reason"-which seems to make it applicable in this
case, the majority interpreted the statute as not protecting adoption decrees
which may have been obtained fraudulently. Therefore, it did not affect
the right of the husband to annul the decree on the grounds that it had
been obtained by fraud or ill practices, provided he brought the action
within one year of the discovery of the fraud or ill practices.37 The court
stated that the purposes of the statute and article 2004 of the Code of
Civil Procedure were compatible-the statute was intended to protect the
interests of the parties involved in the adoption proceedings by affording
finality to the adoption decrees, while the purpose of the code article was
to prevent a party from subverting the judicial process and thereby ob-
taining an unconscionable result. The court concluded that the protection
afforded by section 440 should be given only to those decrees which have
been obtained without fraud or ill practice.
The concurring opinion reached the same result for different reasons.
Justice Dennis stated that the statute was intended to apply to any action
to annul, including the one brought by the plaintiff in this case, but such
an application would be unconstitutional because it would deprive the
plaintiff of his most precious rights as a parent without affording him
the fundamental protection of due process-notice and an opportunity
to be heard.38 The opinion concluded that the state's interest in making
all adoption decrees final in order to create a stable environment for the
children must yield to the right of the affected parent to participate in
the proceeding.
The effect of this decision is that a decree will be protected under
section 440 from a subsequent attack only if the procedures employed
were in accord with the requirements of due process-that reasonable
means were used to notify the affected parent and to give him an oppor-
tunity to protect his parental interests. 9 Otherwise, the judgment.may
be challenged under article 2004 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the
grounds of fraud or ill practices.
36. Stewart v. Goeb, 432 So. 2d 246 (La. 1983).
37. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2004.
38. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
39. Id.
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